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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss a scaling approach to business fluctuations. Our starting point 
consists in recognizing that concepts and methods derived from physics have allowed 
economists to (re)discover a set of stylized facts which have to be satisfactorily accounted 
for in their models. Standard macroeconomics, based on a reductionist approach centered 
on the representative agent, is definitely badly equipped for this task. On the contrary, 
we show that a simple financial fragility agent-based model, based on complex 
interactions of heterogeneous agents, is able to replicate a large number of scaling type 
stylized facts with a remarkable high degree of statistical precision. 
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 1. Introduction 
Recent explorations in industrial dynamics have detected two empirical 
regularities which are so widespread across countries and persistent over time to 
be characterized as universal laws: (i) the distribution of firms’ size is right skew 
and can be described by a Zipf or power law probability density function (Axtell, 
2001; Gaffeo et al. 2003); (ii) the growth rates of firms’ output and countries' GDP 
follow a Laplace distribution (Stanley et al., 1996; Amaral et al., 1997).  
The fact that the distribution of firms’ size is right skew is well known at least 
since Gibrat (1931). As a matter of fact, the strong form of Gibrat’s law implies 
that the distribution is lognormal, while contemporary analysis points to the 
power law as the most accurate statistical description of the empirical 
distribution. It can be argued, however, that the weak form of Gibrat’s law is not 
inconsistent with a power law distribution of firms’ size.  
So far, the literature has dealt with (i) and (ii) as if they were independent 
stylized facts. In this paper we make three contributions.  
• We explore the link between the two, showing that the power law distribution 
of firms’size is at the root of the Laplace distribution of growth rates (i.e. we 
demonstrate that, under very general assumptions, (i) implies (ii)).  
• We demonstrate that the features of business fluctuations such as the shifts of 
the distribution of firms’ size over the cycle, the properties of the 
distribution of individual and aggregate growth rates and many others,1 are 
a consequence of (i). 
• We discuss a model of financial fragility, empirically validated through 
conditioning (Brock, 1999), which generates (i).  
In our approach the origin of business fluctuations – which is the most 
important single problem in macroeconomics – can be traced back to the ever 
changing configuration of the network of heterogeneous interacting firms.2 A 
                                                 
1 Among them the properties of the distribution of the cumulative growth rates during expansions 
and contractions; of the age of exiting firms; of profits and “bad debt”. See also Delli Gatti et al. 
(2003a). 
2 Schumpeter (1939) suggested that business cycle scholars should analyze “… how industries and 
individual firms rise and fall and how their rise and fall affect the aggregates and what we call 
loosely general business conditions”. This approach is reminiscent of Marshall’s parallel between 
the dynamics of the individual firm and the evolution of a tree in the forest. 
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 major role in shaping dynamics is played by financial variables. The sequential 
timing structure of our economy implies that future markets are absent, so that 
agents have to rely on means of payment − here, bank credit extended to firms − 
to bridge the gap between agents' decisions and their realization. Highly 
leveraged (i.e., financially fragile) firms, in turns, are exposed to a high risk of 
default, that is of going bankrupt. When bankruptcies occur, loans not refunded 
negatively affect banks' net worth, with banks responding to their worsen 
financial position by reducing credit supply. The reduction in credit supply 
impacts on the lending interest rate all other firms have to pay to serve their 
financial commitments.  
The practice of combining heterogeneity and interactions is at odds with 
mainstream macroeconomics which reduces the analysis of the aggregate to that 
of a single representative agent and which is unable, by construction, to explain 
non-normal distributions, scaling behavior or the occurrence of large aggregate 
fluctuations as a consequence of small idiosyncratic shocks. 
While the industrial organization literature has explored at large the evidences 
(i) and (ii) at least since the 1950s,3 scarce attention has been paid so far to 
establishing a link to business cycle theory, mainly because mainstream 
macroeconomics lacks the adequate conceptual and analytical tools to 
accomplish such an endeavor. Its reductionist methodology implies that in order 
to understand the working of a system, one has to focus on the working of each 
single element. Assuming that elements are similar and do not interact – i.e. the 
economy is completely described by a representative agent -- the dynamics of the 
aggregate replicate the dynamics of the sub-unit. This assumption requires that 
every element is in equilibrium.  
If the system is far from equilibrium, self-organizing phenomena and a state of 
self-organized criticality (SOC) may occur. According to the notion of SOC (Bak, 
1996; Nørrelykke and Bak, 2002), scaling emerges because the sub-units of a 
system are heterogeneous and interact, and this leads to a critical state without 
any attractive points or states4. The occurrence of a power law may be read as a 
symptom of self organizing processes at work. A notable example of this 
                                                 
3 For a review of the debate on the shape of the firms' size distribution sprung up during the 1950s 
and 60s, see the monograph by Steindl (1965).  
4 In the SOC literature the concept of equilibrium is borrowed from statistical mechanics and is very 
different from that of mainstream economics. In fact, equilibrium results from the balance of actions 
of a large number of many interacting particles. 
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 approach applied to macroeconomics is the inventory and production model 
developed by Bak et al. (1993).  
Alternatively, and in some sense in a way more germane to the economics 
discourse, power laws can be generated by models based on scale free growth 
processes. The basic idea can be traced back to the well-known Simon's model 
(Simon, 1955), where the Gibrat's law of proportional effects is combined with an 
entry process to obtain a Levy distribution for firms' size. Furthermore, recent 
work by physicists (e.g. Marsili and Zhang, 1998; Amaral et al., 1998) has shown 
that, by extending the heterogeneity of the system's components implied in 
Simon's scheme to account for direct or indirect interactions among units, power 
laws emerge naturally and, most notably, without the disturbing asymptotic 
implications of the original Simon's model or of its modern successors, like the 
one by Gabaix (1999).5 
It is worthwhile to stress that, regardless of the modeling strategy one 
chooses, the adoption of the scaling perspective in economics implies rejecting 
the very definition of a representative agent because the dynamics of the system 
originate from the interaction of heterogeneous agents. We believe that, in order 
to grasp the empirical evidence and provide a coherent framework, economists 
have to adopt a methodological approach based on heterogeneous interacting 
agents (HIA) (see Delli Gatti et al.,  2003a, for an example).  
A step in this direction is the agent-based modeling strategy, which is 
increasingly applied also in economics. Agent-based models have been 
developed to study the interaction of many heterogeneous agents. In a sense they 
are based on new microfoundations. The relevance and reliability of these 
microfoundations are grounded in the empirical evidence they can account for. 
Microfoundations can be defined as sound if they produce an economic behavior 
coherent with the empirical evidence, not necessarily with some optimizing 
principle. 
The main shortcuts and the analytical weaknesses of the representative agent 
hypothesis are dealt with in Section 2, where the pros of the HIA methodology are 
also illustrated. Section 3 is devoted to discuss the relationship between power 
law distributions and the business cycle. Section 4 introduces the model (whose 
simulative details can be found in the Appendix) and discusses its dynamical 
properties. Section 5 deals with simulation results, focusing on their consistency 
                                                 
5 Discussions on this point can be found in Krugman (1996) and Blank and Solomon (2000). 
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 with the empirical evidence on some business cycle facts (5.1), and on the 
conditional properties of the model (5.2). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Representative Agent, heterogeneous agents and 
interaction: a methodological digression 
Mainstream economics is based on reductionism, i.e. the methodology of classical 
mechanics. Such a view is coherent if the law of large numbers holds true, i.e.: 
• the functional relationships among variables are linear; and, 
• there is no direct interaction among agents. 
Since non-linearities are pervasive, mainstream economics generally adopts 
the trick of linearizing functional relationships. Moreover agents are supposed to 
be all alike and not to interact. Therefore an economic system can be 
conceptualized as consisting of several identical and isolated components, each 
one being a representative agent (RA). The optimal aggregate solution can be 
obtained by means of a simple summation of the choices made by each 
optimizing agent. Moreover, if the aggregate is the sum of its constitutive 
elements, its dynamics cannot but be identical to that of each single unit.  
The ubiquitous RA, however, is at odds with the empirical evidence (Stoker, 
1993)6, is a major problem in the foundation of general equilibrium theory 
(Kirman, 1992)7,8 and is not coherent with many econometric investigations and 
                                                 
6 A modeling strategy based on the representative agent is not able, by construction,  to reproduce 
the persistent heterogeneity of economic agents, captured by the skewed distribution of several 
industrial variables, such as firms’ size, growth rates etc. Stoker (1993) reviews the empirical 
literature at disaggregated level which shows that heterogeneity matters since there are systematic 
individual differences in economic behavior. Moreover, as Axtell (1999, p.41) claims: “… given the 
power law character of actual firms’ size distribution, it would seem that equilibrium theories of 
the firm  […] will never be able to grasp this essential empirical regularity.”  
7 According to Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988, p. 239): “… There are no assumptions on [...] 
isolated individuals which will give us the properties of aggregate behavior which we need to 
obtain uniqueness and stability. Thus we are reduced to making assumptions at the aggregate 
level, which cannot be justified, by the usual individualistic assumptions. This problem is usually 
avoided in the macroeconomic literature by assuming that the economy behaves like an individual. 
Such an assumption cannot be justified in the context of the standard economic model and the way 
to solve the problem may involve rethinking the very basis on which this model is founded.” This 
long quotation summarizes the conclusion drawn by Arrow (1951), Sonnenschein (1972), and 
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 tools (Lippi and Forni, 1997)9. All in all, we may say that macroeconomics (and 
macroeconometrics) still lacks sound microfoundations. 
The search for natural laws in economics does not necessarily require the 
adoption of the reductionist paradigm. Scaling phenomena and power law 
distributions are a case in point. If a scaling behavior exists, then the search for 
universality can be pushed very far. Physicists have shown that scaling laws are 
generated by a system with strong HIA (Marsili and Chang, 1999; Amaral et al., 
1998) and therefore are incompatible with reductionism. As a consequence, the 
occurrence of scaling laws in economics is incompatible with mainstream 
economics. The macroscopic pattern (consisting of a multitude of heterogeneous 
interacting units) works as a unified whole independent of the dynamical process 
governing its individual components. The idea that systems which consist of a 
large number of interacting agents generates universal, or scaling, laws that do not 
depend on microscopic details is now popular in statistical physics and is gaining 
momentum in economics as well.  
The quantum revolution of last century radically changed the perspective in 
contemporary physics, leading to a widespread rejection of reductionism. 
According to the holistic approach, the aggregate is different from the sum of its 
components because of the interaction of particles. The properties of the sub-
units are not intrinsic but can be grasped only analyzing the behavior of the 
aggregate as a whole. The concept of equilibrium is therefore different from that 
of mainstream economics. The equilibrium of a system does not require any more 
that every element is in equilibrium, but rather that the aggregate is quasi-stable, 
                                                                                                                                     
Mantel (1976) on the lack of theoretical foundations of the proposition according to which the 
properties of an aggregate function reflect those of the individual components.  
8 In General Equilibrium theory one can put all the heterogeneity s/he likes, but no direct 
interaction among agents. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) has shown that in this case one cannot have 
any sort of informational perfection. If information is not perfect markets cannot be efficient. 
Market failure leads to agents’ interaction and to coordination failures, emerging properties of 
aggregate behavior, and to a pathological nature of business fluctuations.  
9 If agents are heterogeneous, some standard procedures (e.g. cointegration, Granger-causality, 
impulse-response functions of structural VARs) loose their significance. Moreover, neglecting 
heterogeneity in aggregate equations generates spurious evidence of dynamic structure. The 
difficulty of testing aggregate models based on the RA hypothesis, i.e. to impose aggregate 
regularity at the individual level, has been long pointed out by Lewbel (1989) and Kirman (1992) 
with no impact on the mainstream (a notable exceptions is Carroll, 2001). 
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 i.e. in “… a state of macroeconomic equilibrium maintained by a large number of 
transitions in opposite directions” (Feller, 1957, p. 356). 10  
In terms of a power law distribution, it means that firms are located along a 
curve whose coefficient is stable and the intercept changes very slowly over 
time.11  This is due to the fact that the data generating process is random: in terms 
of the state of a process we may say that the transition from one state to another is 
affected by chance as well by agents’ systematic actions.12 
In the model of Section 4, output fluctuations are due to: 1) a random process 
on current revenues as a consequence of imperfect information on actual prices; 
2) systematic interactions among agents. The distribution is quasi-stable over 
relatively long periods because it represents “… slowly changing, age-dependent 
characteristics of a population which ages and renews itself only gradually” 
(Steindl, 1965, p.142). This means that, since firms are born small, their growth 
takes time and mortality decreases with age and size, the slow change of the 
distribution comes as a consequence. In a nutshell: the distribution is stable, or 
quasi-stable, because the dissipative force of the process (here, the Gibrat’s law) 
produces a tendency to a growing dispersion, which is counteracted by a 
stabilizing force (i.e., the burden of debt commitments and the associated risk of 
bankruptcy). 
Moreover, distributions are interconnected. The population is characterized by 
a joint distribution of several variables (in our model: equity, capital, debt, age, 
equity ratio), which is completely inconsistent with the RA framework.13 The 
                                                 
10 Moreover agents’ choice should not necessarily be an equilibrium one, derived from their 
optimizing behavior, because agents’ interaction generates self-organizing solutions. It follows 
from this that one should not analyze the individual problem in isolation from the others (a game 
against nature) but  rather the interconnections among HIAs. 
11 Stability of the slope through time is a quite standard result in the empirical literature on Pareto’s 
law (see e.g., the work by C. Gini, J. Steindl and H. Simon). Quite nicely, Steindl (1965, p.143) 
defines the Pareto coefficient “… a sediment of growth over a long time”.  
12 The biased behavior of this random process helps to explain the systematic differences 
(asymmetries) between expansions and contractions found in the empirical evidence. Gaffeo et al. 
(2003) have found systematic differences of the Pareto exponents during expansions and 
contractions. 
13 Marshall once said that there are several representative agents, meaning that the RA framework 
is a statistical tool, whose average values are actually representative of several distribution.  
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 change of firms’ distribution (and the business cycle itself) has to be analyzed in 
terms of changes of the joint distribution of the population.14  
 
3. Gibrat, Pareto, Laplace: the statistical analysis of 
industrial dynamics 
In this section we set up and discuss some statistical foundations for the results 
that will be presented in Section 5. As already pointed out, in our HIA 
framework the analysis of business cycles is intertwined with the properties and 
evolution of the firms’ size distribution, which in turn is empirically well 
approximated by a power law. A well known object mainly in physics and 
biology, the power law distribution has been originally derived more than a 
hundred years ago by Vilfredo Pareto, who argued that the distribution of 
personal incomes above a certain threshold y0 follows a heavy-tailed distribution 
(Pareto, 1897). In particular, he showed that the probability to observe an income 
Y greater than or equal to y is proportional to a power of y:  
 
Pr( )Y y y α−≥ ∝        (1) 
 
with α close to 1.5. This fact immediately started to baffle scholars given that, 
under the reasonable assumption that the rates of growth of income brackets are 
only moderately correlated, the Central Limit Theorem implies that the income 
distribution should be lognormal. This conundrum regarding the limiting 
distribution of multiplicative stochastic processes became explicit about 30 years 
later in industrial economics, thanks to the pioneering work of Gibrat (1931). 
Gibrat claimed that − the law of proportional effects holding true, i.e. that the 
growth rate of each firm is independent of its size (Gibrat’s law in weak form) − 
the distribution of firms’ size must be right skewed. He went even further, arguing 
that, if the rates of growth are only moderately correlated, such distribution must 
be a member of the log-normal family (Gibrat's law in strong form). In a nutshell, 
the size (measured by output, capital stock or number of employed workers) of the 
                                                 
14 A recession, e.g., is more likely when firms are relatively young, small and leveraged. The RA 
framework not only is inconsistent with the evidence (i) but it also misses and outguesses any 
dynamical properties of the actual systems (Forni and Lippi, 1997). 
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 i-th firm KiT  in period T is defined as ( )iTiTiT gKK += − 11
1
log
T
t
itiT gK +≅ ∑
=
, where giT is the rate of 
growth. Taking the log of both sides and solving back recursively from a time 0 
size Ki0, it is straightforward to obtain . Assuming that 
the growth rates are identically independently distributed, the distribution of the 
log of firms’ size tends asymptotically – i.e. for t approaching infinity – to the 
lognormal distribution.  Notice that from Gibrat’s analysis one would expect the 
distribution of firms' growth rates to be normal.  
0log iK
Recent empirical research (Axtell, 2001; Gaffeo et al., 2003)15 has shown, 
however, that the distribution of firms’ size follows a Zipf or power law16 instead 
of a lognormal distribution. Moreover, Stanley et al. (1996) and Amaral et al. 
(1997) have found that the growth rate of firms’ output ζi follows, instead of a 
normal distribution, a Laplace distribution: 
 
( ) ( ii bbbL ζζ −= exp2, )
                                                
      (2) 
 
where b > 0 is the scale parameter. 
To explain this puzzle, the literature has followed two lines of research. The 
first one is a-theoretical and focuses only on the statistical properties of the link 
between the distribution of the state variable (firms’ size) and that of the rates of 
change. For instance, Reed (2001) shows that independent rates of change do not 
generate a lognormal distribution of firms’ size if the time of observation of 
firms’ variables is not deterministic but is itself a random variable following 
approximately an exponential distribution. In this case, even if Gibrat’s law holds 
at the individual level, firms’ variables will converge to a double Pareto 
distribution. 
The second line of research – to which the model described in the following 
section belongs - stresses the importance of non-price interactions among firms 
 
15 But see also Ijiri and Simon (1977). 
16 To be precise, the Zipf’s law is the discrete counterpart of the Pareto continuous distribution 
(power law). It links  the probability to observe the dimension of a social or natural phenomenon 
(firms, cities, earthquakes, words in a text, etc.) with rank greater than, say, r with the cumulative 
frequency. In case of firms’ size the scale parameter is equal to 1. In other words, the cumulative 
frequency is proportional to the inverse of firm’s dimension: ( ) 1Pr −∝≥ κκitK . 
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 hit by multiplicative shocks, hence building on the framework put forward by 
Herbert Simon and his co-authors during the 1950s and 60s (Ijiri and Simon, 
1977). As a matter of example, Bottazzi and Secchi (2003) obtain a Laplace 
distribution of firms’ growth rates within Simon's model, just relaxing the 
assumption of independence of firms’ growth rates.17 
This result can be further generalized, in that a Laplace distribution for 
growth rates can be derived as soon as the size of the state variable under 
scrutiny is Pareto distributed. As discussed in Palestrini (2003), one can start 
from the definition of the growth rate as the log-difference of the state variable's 
levels, so that the proof consists in showing that: 1) the logarithm of a Pareto 
random variable follows an exponential distribution; and 2) the difference of two 
exponential random variables becomes a Laplace distribution. 
Proposition 1) may be proved using the monotonic property of the logarithmic 
function and the rule of transformation of random variables. Assuming that x 
follows a Pareto distribution with parameter α it is possible to derive the 
probability distribution of Y = log(X): 
 
 ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) (( )
( )y-exp                
expexpPr                
logPrPr
α
α
=
∝≥=
≥=≥
−yyx
yxyY
)
                                                
    (3) 
 
that is, an exponential distribution with parameter α. In the case of independent 
exponential variables, proposition 2) can be proved − albeit in a more 
cumbersome way − using the convolution theorem and its relation with the 
 
17 In principle these results can induce the reader to reject the strong version of Gibrat’s law. After 
all, this law claims that the distribution of the levels (firms’ size measured in output or capital 
units) is lognormal – while the empirical analysis points to Zipf’s law - and the distribution of 
growth rates is normal – while it seems to be Laplace. As a matter of fact, things are not that simple. 
The idea according to which Gibrat’s law has to be fully discarded is wrong, given that in the recent 
literature a weak version seems to hold, in which growth rates seem to be independent at least in 
mean. In fact, Lee et al. (1998) show that the variance of growth rates depends negatively on firm’s 
size. The implications of the strong version of Gibrat’s law are not necessarily true in the weak 
version. Fujiwara et al. (2003) have shown, in fact, that if the distribution is characterized by time-
reversal symmetry – i.e. the joint probability distribution of two consecutive years is symmetric in its 
arguments P12(x1,x2) = P12(x2,x1) – the weak version of Gibrat’s law can yield a power law of firms’ 
size. Hence power law and Gibrat’s law (weak version) are not necessarily inconsistent. 
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 characteristic function. Furthermore, one can show that the causal relationship 
between Pareto (for levels) and Laplace (for growth rates) distributions holds 
also in the general case, but the shape of the Laplace distribution of growth rates 
changes over the business cycles (Palestrini, 2003). In particular, the scale 
parameter b decreases during expansions and increases during recessions.  
The main message looming large from the statistical results discussed so far is 
that the scaling approach to business fluctuations derives in the first place from 
the levels of state variables being distributed as a power law. Thus, the basic 
question to be answered is whether scale invariance for state variables' levels is a 
general feature of economic systems or not. From this viewpoint, it emerges that 
power law probability functions arise endogenously in economics basically for 
two reasons: 1) the lack of a characteristic scale in empirical and theoretical 
economics, implying that the occurrence of either rare or frequent events (i.e., 
sizes) is governed by the same law (Zajdenweber, 1997); 2) a power law behavior 
in the tail(s) of a distribution is a feature of a family of distributions known as 
Lévy-stable distributions. Due to a generalization of the central limit theorem 
(Gnedenko and Kolmogorov, 1954), the sum of a large number of identical and 
independent random variables has a probability density function characterized 
by a four-parameter characteristic function M(t), which in logarithm reads as: 
 
[1 sgn( ) tan( / 2)],  1
ln ( ) 2[1 sgn( ) ln( )],  1  
i t t i t
M t
i t t i t
αµ γ β πγ α
µ γ β γ απ
 − −=  − + =
≠
  (4) 
 
where 0 < α  ≤ 2 is the stability parameter, γ is a positive scale factor, µ is a real 
number, and β is the skewness parameter  ranging  from -1 to 1. Expanding M(t) 
in Taylor series it is possible to show (e.g., Mantegna and Stanley, 2000) that the 
probability density function of a Lévy random variable x is, in the tails, 
proportional to ( α+− 1x ) . Lévy distributions are stable under convolution, 
meaning that the sum of N identically independently distributed (iid) α-stable 
Lévy variables is also Lévy distributed, with the same stability parameter α.  
When α = 2, β = 0 and 
2
2σγ = , the distribution is Gaussian with mean µ and 
variance σ 2. The Gaussian family is the only member of the Lévy class for which 
the variance exists. The presence of second moments implies that, if disturbances 
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 hitting firms are only idiosyncratic ones, aggregate fluctuations disappear as the 
number of firms N grows large. In fact, without aggregate shocks the variance of 
the average output of N firms is less than the maximum variance of firms’ 
output, say 
N
2
maxσ , a quantity that, for N going to infinity, vanishes. On the 
contrary, stable distributions with α < 2 do not need aggregate shocks to generate 
aggregate fluctuations. 18, 19  
             
Figure 1. Comparison between two simulated economies, inhabited by 10000 firms each. In the first 
economy (black line) agents’ size distribution is Pareto with location parameters k = 1 and stability 
parameter α = 1.5. In the second economy (grey line) agents’ size distribution is lognormal, with the 
same mean (i.e., 3) and same estimated variance at t=0 (i.e., 10.4) of the other economy. The plot 
describes the two time series of agents’ average output, Ypa (the time evolution of the mean of the 
Pareto distributed firms) and Yln (the time evolution of the mean of the lognormal distributed 
firms). 
 
The difference between the two situations may be well described by the 
example depicted in Figure 1, where we report the average output time path of 
two economies identical but for the shape of their firms' size distributions. In the 
                                                 
18 The first author conjecturing it explicitly has been Mandelbrot (1960). 
19 From this viewpoint, in real world normality (in terms of Gaussian distributed variables) might 
just be a special case. 
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 first economy firms are Pareto distributed, whereas in the second one the 
distribution of firm’s size is lognormal. Output is assumed to be proportional to 
size. Time series have been obtained by averaging from samples extracted from 
the two distributions at any time period t. 
The time evolution of the average output shows almost no aggregate 
fluctuations for the lognormal economy, but large fluctuations in the Pareto 
economy even in the absence of aggregate shocks. In particular, the variance of 
the average aggregate output in the Pareto case is one order of magnitude greater 
than the variance of the lognormal case. Put differently, stable Pareto-Lévy 
distributions are good candidates to explain aggregate large fluctuations in time 
periods characterized by small aggregate shocks.  
In what follows, we build on the HIA framework developed in Gallegati et al. 
(2003) and Delli Gatti et al. (2003a) to put at work all the notions we surveyed in 
this section, by modeling an economy characterized by aggregate scaling 
behaviors due to multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks and interactions among 
firms.  
 
4. Financial fragility and business fluctuations: a model 
Consider a sequential economy,20 with time running discretely in periods t = 1, 
2,…, populated by many firms and banks. Two markets are opened in each 
period: the market for an homogenous produced good, and the market for credit. 
As in the levered aggregate supply class of models first developed by Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1990, 1993), our model is fully supply-determined,21 in the sense that 
firms can sell all the output they (optimally) decide to produce.  
                                                 
20 Recall that in a sequential economy (Hahn, 1982) spot markets open at given dates, while future 
markets do not operate. 
21 Two scenarios are consistent with this assumption. In the equilibrium scenario, aggregate demand 
accommodates supply, i.e. households and firms absorb all the output produced by the latter and 
the goods market is always in equilibrium. In this scenario, aggregate investment must be equal to 
the sum of retained profits and households' saving. As we will see, both investment and retained 
profit are determined in the model, so that we have to assume that households' saving adjusts in 
order to fill the gap between the two. In the disequilibrium scenario, aggregate demand does not 
(necessarily) accommodate supply, so that the goods market is generally not in equilibrium. In this 
case, the difference between aggregate investment on the one hand, and the sum of profit and 
households' saving on the other must be assumed to take the form of involuntary inventories 
decumulation.  
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 Due to informational imperfections on the equity market, firms can raise 
funds only on the credit market. The demand for credit is related to investment 
expenditure, which is therefore dependent on banks' interest rates. Total credit 
supply, in turn, is a multiple of the banks' equity base, which is negatively 
affected as insolvent borrowing firms go bankrupt. As we will discuss below, this 
mean-field interaction provides a mechanism to create long-range inter-temporal 
correlations capable to amplify and propagate idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
 
4.1 Firms 
At any time period t, the supply side of the economy consists of finitely many 
competitive firms indexed with i = 1, …, Nt, each one located on an island. The 
total number of firms (hence, islands) Nt depends on t because of endogenous 
entry and exit processes to be described below. Let the i-th firm uses capital (Kit) 
as the only input to produce a homogeneous output (Yit) by means of a linear 
production technology, Yit = φKit. Capital productivity (φ) is constant and uniform 
across firms, and the capital stock never depreciates. 
The demand for goods in each island is affected by an iid idiosyncratic real 
shock. Since arbitrage opportunities across islands are imperfect, the individual 
selling price in the i-th island is the random outcome of a market process around 
the average market price of output Pt, according to the law Pit = uitPt, with 
expected value E(uit) = 1 and finite variance. 
By assumption, firms are fully rationed on the equity market, so that the only 
external source of finance at their disposal is credit. The balance sheet identity 
implies that firms can finance their capital stock by recurring either to net worth 
(Ait) or to bank loans (Lit), Kit = Ait + Lit. Under the assumption that firms and 
banks sign long-term contractual relationships, at each t debt commitments in 
real terms for the i-th firm are ritLit, where rit is the real interest rate.22 If, for the 
sake of simplicity, the latter is also the real return on net worth, each firm incurs 
financing costs equal to rit(Lit + Ait) = ritKit. Total variable costs proportional to 
financing costs23, gritKit, with g > 1. Therefore, profit in real terms (πit) is: 
 
                                                 
22 It follows that the credit lines periodically extended by the bank to each firm are based on a 
mortgaged debt contract. 
23 As a matter of example, one can think of retooling and adjustment costs to be sustained each time 
the production process starts. 
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 ( itititititititit KgruKgrYu )−=−= φπ .    (5) 
 
and expected profit is E(πit) = (φ − grit)Kit. 
In this economy, firms may go bankrupt as soon as their net worth becomes 
negative, that is Ait < 0. The law of motion of Ait is: 
 
ititit AA π+= −1 ,        (6) 
 
that is, net worth in previous period plus (minus) profits (losses). Making use of 
(5) and (6), it follows that the bankruptcy state occurs whenever: 
 
 it
it
it
itit uK
A
gru ≡


 −= −11φ .       (7) 
 
As in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990, 1993), the probability of bankruptcy ( fPr ) 
is incorporated directly into the firm's profit function because going bankrupt 
costs, and such a cost is increasing in the firm's output. Assuming for 
expositional convenience that uit is uniformly distributed on the support (0,2), 
and that bankruptcy costs are quadratic,  with c > 0, the objective 
function takes the form:
2
it
f cYC =
24 
  
( ) ( ititititititit KAKgrcKgr 122 −−−−=Γ )φφ .     (8) 
 
From the first order condition, the optimal capital stock is: 
 
it
it
it
itd
it gr
A
grc
gr
K
2
1−+−= φ
φ
.      (9) 
 
Thus, the desired capital stock in t is decreasing (non-linearly) with the 
interest rate and it increases linearly with financial robustness, as proxied by the 
                                                 
24 For this program to be well defined and the second term on the l.h.s. of (4) to be interpreted as an 
expected bankruptcy cost, g should be such that the condition Ait-1 < gritKit holds. 
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 t−1 net worth. Time period t desired investment is simply the difference between 
the desired capital stock and the capital stock inherited from the previous period, 
. To finance it, the i-th firm recurs to retained profits and, if 
needed, to new mortgaged debt, 
1−−= itditit KKI
ititit LI ∆+= −1π ,25 where ∆Lit = Lit - Lit-1. Making 
use of (4), the demand for credit is given by: 
 
( )
11 2
21
−− 


 −+−−= it
it
it
it
it
itd
it Agr
gr
grc
gr
L πφ
φ
.    (10) 
 
 
4.2 The banking sector 
We model the banking sector in terms of the reduced form from the working of 
an oligopolistic industry. The balance sheet of the banking sector is , 
with L
tt
s
t DEL +=
t being total credit supply, Et the banks' equity base and Dt deposits which, 
in this framework, are determined as a residual. To determine the aggregate level 
of credit supply, we assume that banks are subject to a prudential rule set up by a 
regulatory body such that ν1−= tst EL , where the risk coefficient ν is constant. 
Hence, the healthier are banks from a financial viewpoint, the higher is the 
aggregate credit supply (Hubbard et al., 2002).  
Credit is allotted to each individual firm i on the basis of the mortgage it 
offers, which is proportional to its size, and to the amount of cash available to 
serve debt26 according to the rule:    
 
( )
1
1
1
1 1
−
−
−
− −+=
t
it
s
t
it
s
s
it A
A
L
K
K
LL λλ       (11) 
 
                                                 
25 A word of caution is in order here. The law of motion of the net worth (4) seems to imply that the 
correct time at which profit had to be taken into account in deriving the demand for credit should 
be time period t. In fact, the timing structure of the model is such that when deciding how much to 
borrow from banks, firms do not have received any time t revenues yet. Hence, at the beginning of 
time period t the only internal finance they can count on are inherited equity and time t−1 profits. 
26 For evidence on the effects exerted by firms' size and credit worthiness on banks' loan policies see 
e.g. Strahan (1999). 
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 with , , and 0 < λ < 1. The equilibrium interest rate 
for the i-th firm is determined as credit demand (10) equals credit supply (11), 
that is:  
∑−
=
−− =
1
1
11
tN
i
itt KK ∑−
=
−− =
1
1
11
tN
i
itt AA
 
( )[ ]1111
1
1212
2
−−−−
−
−++


 ++
+=
ititsitit
it
it
cgLA
c
cg
A
r
αλλκπφ
.   (12) 
 
where κit-1 and αit-1 are the ratios of individual to total capital and net worth, 
respectively. 
Under the assumption that the returns on the banks' equity are given by the 
average of lending interest rates tr , while deposits are remunerated with the 
borrowing rate r , the banks' profit ( ) is given by: At
B
tπ
 
( )[∑
∈
−− +−−=
tNi
ttt
s
itit
B
t EDrLr 111 ωπ ]      (13) 
 
with ω−1
1
 being the spread between lending and borrowing rates. Note that ω, 
which in what follows will be treated parametrically, captures the degree of 
competition in the banking sector: the higher is ω, the higher is the interests' 
spread which, in turn, increases with a higher monopolistic power of banks. 
When a firm goes bankrupt, Kit < Lit. In this case, the banking sector as a whole 
registers a loss equal to the difference between the total amount of credit 
supplied up to time period t and the relative mortgage, Bit = Lit − Kit = − Ait, where 
Ait < 0 if firm i belong to the set of bankrupt firms Ωt. Let us call Bit bad debt. The 
banking sector's equity base evolves according to the law of motion: 
 
∑
−Ω∈
−− −+=
1
11
ti
tt
B
tt BEE π .        (14) 
 
Through the banking sector's equity base law of motion, idiosyncratic real 
disturbances leading to a bankruptcy have systemic consequences: an increase of 
 17
 bad debt forces the aggregate credit supply shifting to the left, thus raising the 
financial costs due to a higher interest rate, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the 
distribution of firms' net worth influences the average lending interest rate, 
which in turn affects the bank's profit and, eventually, credit supply. Thus, firms 
dynamically affect each other through indirect interactions. In particular, 
interactions are global and independent of any topological space, and they occur 
through a field variable, which in our case is the banking sector's balance sheet 
(Aoki, 1996).  
Interactions, if strong enough, allow the system to escape from the property of 
square root scaling for sums of iid shocks due to the Central Limit Theorem.27 It is 
well known from statistic theory (e.g, Resnik, 1987) that as N grows large, 
independence of idiosyncratic disturbances implies that the volatility of the 
system decays with the square root of size, leading to a power law distribution 
with exponent β = −0.5. If distant agents are sufficiently correlated through 
interactions, in turn, aggregate volatility decays more slowly, according to a 
power law with exponent β  < −0.5. The empirical evidence reported in Amaral et 
al. (1997) for companies and in Canning et al. (1998) for countries goes precisely 
in this direction. 
 
 
4.3 Firms' demography 
Recent empirical work has shown that firms entering and exiting markets 
contribute almost as much to employment and macroeconomic fluctuations as  
firms continuing their activity (e.g., Davis et al., 1996). Hence, any theory of 
business fluctuations should pay particular attention to the way entry and exit of 
firms are modeled.28 
In our framework, exits are endogenously determined as financially fragile 
firms go bankrupt, that is as their net worth becomes negative. Besides making 
the total output to shrink, exits cause the equity of the banking sector − and, in 
turn, aggregate credit − to go down. As discussed above, this mean field 
interaction in terms of a bank effect (Hubbard at al., 2002) amplifies and 
propagates idiosyncratic shocks all over the economy. 
                                                 
27 This is another way to explicate the arguments reported in section 3. 
28 Delli Gatti et al. (2003b) provide an extensive analysis on the relationship between entries and 
exits and aggregate fluctuations in a model very similar to this one. 
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 As regards entries, the literature has suggested models ranging from 
exogenously defined purely stochastic processes (Winter et al., 1997), to models 
where entry is endogenous in that the number of entrants depends on expected 
profit opportunities (Hopenhayn, 1992). Alas, the available evidence has been so 
far inconclusive. Caves (1998), for instance, claims that the only firm points are 
that entrants are in general largely unsure about the probability of prospective 
success, and that entries does not occur at a unique sector-specific optimal size.  
Our modeling strategy aims at capturing these facts by means of a mechanism 
in which a probabilistic process is affected by prospective performance, and 
entries can take place at different sizes. First, the number of new entrants ( ) 
is obtained by multiplying a constant 
entry
tN
N  > 1 to a probability which depends 
negatively on the average lending interest rate: 
 
([ )]erd
NentryNN
it
entry
t −+== −1exp1
)Pr(    (15) 
 
where d and e are constants. The higher is the interest rate, the higher are 
financial commitments, and the lower are expected profits, with entries being 
lower in number. Second, entrants' size in terms of their capital stock is drawn 
from a uniform distribution centered around the mode of the size distribution of 
incumbent firms, each entrant being endowed with an equity ratio (
it
it
it K
A
a = ) 
equal to the mode of the equity base distribution of incumbents.  
 
 
4.4 Long-run dynamics 
In order to understand the long-run − i.e., growth − properties of our economy, it 
is convenient to consider a deterministic version of the model. Indeed, 
abstracting from uncertainty means getting rid of heterogeneity, so that we can 
easily keep track of the dynamic behavior of a representative firm. If the interest 
rate is assumed constant, from (5), (6) and (9) it turns out that the law of motion 
of the net worth is:  
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The solution of this first order difference equation returns the steady state 
gross growth rate of the economy, 

 −1
2
1
gr
φ , which implies positive growth 
whenever ( ) 0>− grφ : whenever the return to capital is higher than its cost, the 
economy is characterized by endogenous growth. This result is far from 
surprising as soon as we note that in our model the production function exhibits 
constant returns to the only input that can be accumulated, which is the same 
engine of growth as in the well-known AK endogenous growth model developed 
by Rebelo (1991).  
This analogy can be further extended to appreciate the special role played by 
credit in our economy. First, recall that in the Rebelo's model the steady-state 
growth rate depends positively on the saving rate. In our partial equilibrium 
analysis savings are implicitly defined as the difference between investment and 
retained profits,29 so that at each time period t total savings are equal to banks' 
loans. Indeed, changes in the banking regulatory regime or in the competitive 
pressure in the banking sector end up affecting the equilibrium lending interest 
rate, and through it the long-run growth rate.  
 
5. Simulation results 
The complexity of the model directs the analysis of its high-frequency properties 
towards computer simulation techniques. Figures 2 and 3 exhibit the evolution of 
an artificial economy lasting 1000 time periods, implemented using the 
framework analyzed in the previous section with a starting number of 10000 
firms.30 In particular, in Figure 2 we show the time path of the logarithm of total 
output, whereas in Figure 3 it is drawn its volatility expressed in terms of 
output's growth rates.  
                                                 
29 See the equilibrium scenario depicted in note 5. 
30 In the following, every simulation were conducted by means of Swarm, an agent-based  software 
developed at the Santa Fe Institute to implement artificial economies. Interested readers can find it 
at the web site: www.swarm.org. 
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 From Figure 2 it emerges that our stochastic economy, buffeted with iid 
idiosyncratic disturbances only, is characterized by sizable aggregate fluctuations; 
that its growth process displays a broken-trend behavior31 (Perron, 1987); and that 
Great Depressions (e.g., the one during the simulation time period 855-880) can 
suddenly punctuate its time path, due to bankruptcies of great firms that origin 
remarkable impacts on the business cycle via the financial sector (Gabaix, 2003). 
The output series possesses an autocorrelation parameter equal to 0.99. 
Interestingly, before large downturns our model seems to exhibit a common 
pattern: starting from a constant growth trend, the economy gains momentum with 
accelerating growth and increasing volatility, to subsequently move into a deep 
recession. 
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Figure 2. Logarithm of the aggregate output. The first 150 periods have been deleted to get rid of 
transients. 
 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, fluctuations as measured by output's 
growth rates are characterized by cluster volatility, a well known phenomenon 
mostly in the financial market literature due to the heavy tails character of asset 
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31 For instance, the average growth rate goes from 0.19% in periods 150-350, to 0.25% in periods 
351-780, to 0.37% in periods 780-855, to 0.31% in periods 880-1000. Yearly average growth rates 
more close to reality could be obtained in this model through a more careful calibration exercise. 
Given that our main interest is in business fluctuations, however, we leave this undertaking to 
future research.  
 returns' distributions (Cont et al., 1997). The growth rates' standard deviation is  
0.0289. 
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Figure 3. Growth rates of aggregate output. 
 
     
5.1 Firms' size and growth rates distributions 
In Figure 4 we report the Zipf plot for firm sizes recorded at simulation time 
period 1000. In agreement with recent empirical results (Axtell, 2001) the firms' 
size distribution is skewed and it follows a power law. Furthermore, the scaling 
exponents recorded (α = 1.11) are consistent with what found in real data (Gaffeo 
et al., 2003). As widely shown in the complexity literature, the emergence of such 
a distribution is deeply correlated with the hypothesis of interaction of 
heterogeneous agents that is at the root of the model. More specifically, the 
interaction among units buffeted with multiplicative iid shocks leads the system's 
dynamics  to a complex critical state in which no attractive point or state 
emerges. In terms of business fluctuations, it means that there is not a single and 
determinate equilibrium, but a non-stable state emerges after each recessive or 
expansive episode.  
The firms' size distribution tends to shift to the right during growing phases, 
while during recessions the estimated stability parameter α decreases. In fact, 
during expansions greater firms tend to grow faster than smaller ones, causing a 
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 higher slope of the interpolating line if compared with the situation observed 
during recessions. On the contrary, bankruptcies of great firms during 
downturns cause a more equal distribution of the size distribution. Once again, 
this is precisely what observed in real data (Gaffeo et al., 2003). 
 
                          
 
Figure 4. Zipf plot of firm sizes. 
 
Stanley et al. (1996) and Bottazzi and Secchi (2003), among others, find that the 
growth rates of firms are generally well fitted by a Laplace (or double 
exponential) distribution. As discussed in Section 3, such a finding can be shown 
to derive from firms' size being distributed as a power law. In fact, simulated 
data for firms' growth rates, reported in Figure 5, are well approximated by a 
(asymmetric) Laplace distribution.  
In another stimulating paper, Lee et al. (1998) show that binned growth rates 
for firms and countries' GDPs settle on the same regression line in a log-log plot. 
If analyzed from a complex perspective, this result signals the presence of self 
similarity32, i.e. the behavior of greatest units (countries) reproduces the behavior 
of smaller units (firms), possibly corrected by a scale factor (Durlauf, 2003). As 
shown in Figure 5, where we plot the distribution of the growth rates of 
aggregate output, this feature has been recorded in our model as well. The 
                                                 
32 According to Sornette (2000, p.94), self-similarity occurs when "… arbitrary sub-parts are 
statistically similar to the whole, provided a suitable magnification is performed along all 
directions”. 
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 difference of parameters between the firms' growth rate and the aggregate output 
growth rates distributions is sensible, in our simulations, to the modeling choice 
for the production function, though we do not have at this stage any analytical 
result to prove it. 
 
                
                          
Figure 5. Distribution of firms growth rates. 
 
 
                 
 
Figure 6. growth rates of aggregate output. 
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 The model is capable to display several other striking similarities with 
observable facts33. In particular: 1) the frequency of firms’ exits seems to be well 
approximated by an exponential function of firms' age (Steindl, 1965; Fujiwara, 
2003); 2) bad debt, that is the amount of unpaid loans due to bankruptcies 
extended by the banking sector, follows a stretched exponential distribution 
(Delli Gatti et al., 2003d); 3) profits are power law distributed, and exhibit time 
reversal symmetry (Fujiwara, 2003); 4) expansions and recessions, measured as 
trough-to-peak and peak-to-trough of the GDP growth rates time series, are 
distributed as a Weibull (Di Guilmi et al., 2003); 5) the rate of return on the capital 




i
i
K
π  and the equity ratio ai are positively correlated; 6) a higher equity ratio is 
associated with a lower volatility of profits, the last two facts being consistent 
with the evidence one can obtained by analyzing the sample of firms in Bureau 
van Dijk's AMADEUS, a commercially available data set. 
 
 
5.2 Conditional distributions 
In this subsection we address a typical aggregation issue, known as the mixture 
problem, which is likely to negatively affect the reliability of results as soon as 
scaling plots are taken into account (Brock, 1999; Durlauf, 2003). Roughly 
speaking, the mixture problem asserts that, when aggregating economic units 
with different behaviors, it is possible to observe marginal distributions with 
heavy tails even though conditional distributions do not possess such a property. 
In other terms, a power law may appear simply because heterogeneous units 
governed by different stochastic processes are erroneously mixed, instead of 
signaling the invariant properties of a unique Lévy-stable underlying stochastic 
process. In fact, if the latter is the case one should observe the same scaling 
behavior independently of which conditioned sub-sample is considered. In fact, 
the mixture problem may be present in our work, since the model described in 
Section 4 implies different behaviors according to the financial position of firms, 
as well as differently aged firms.  
 
                                                 
33 Details can be found in companion papers (Delli Gatti et al., 2003b; 2003c). 
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Figure 8. Profit distribution conditioned on the equity ratio, with firms grouped in 10 bins.   
 
To understand which variable is likely to be most suitable for conditioning, 
we start considering one of the basic hypothesis at the root of the model 
mechanics, that is the fact that an heavy indebted firm is forced to use a large 
amount of its revenues to pay for its financial commitments, instead of using it 
for real investments. In other terms, a high leverage is likely to reduce the 
profitability index. The analysis of the relationship between profit rate and equity 
ratio, conducted by means of nonparametric regression34, returns an upward 
sloping trend (Figure 8) as one would expect from the theoretical model, and in 
line with what recorded for empirical data. Furthermore, simulations show that 
the rate of profit distribution shifts to the right when conditioning on the equity 
ratio35, and that the probability to fail does not depend on the size but only on the 
financial position36. This is important for the analysis to follow, suggesting that to 
address the mixture problem it is sufficient to compute firms’ distributions 
conditional on the equity ratio.  
                                                 
34 We use a kernel density estimation (Härdle, 1990), with a Gaussian kernel. 
35 The shape of the conditioned profit distributions depends on the assumption one makes on the 
distribution of idiosyncratic real shocks. We made several trials, to conclude that the best 
approximation to what observed in real data could be obtained by forcing the relative price shocks 
to be normally distributed. Nevertheless, none of the model's properties discussed in the main text 
are qualitatively affected by this modeling choice. 
36 This finding could be further conceived by recalling that firs' exists are exponentially distributed, 
and that the exponential distribution possesses the well known property of being memoryless. 
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Figure 9. Zipf plot of firms dimension sorted by equity ratio (a). 
 
Hence, the power law behavior of the firms' size distribution is analyzed 
partitioning the [0,1] interval, to which a belongs, in several bins (chosen 
according to a percentile allotment). Figure 9 shows that data from different 
distributions conditioned on the equity partition [0, 0.1734], (0.1734, 0.2269], 
(0.2269, 0.3319]37 collapse on the same interpolating line, a clear sign of self-
similarity, thus signaling that the unconditional distribution of firms' size is 
likely to display a scaling behavior because of its true nature and not due to 
spurious mixing.  
As one would expect by combining this finding and the results summarized in 
Section 3, the level of the equity ratio seems not to have any influence on the 
relative growth of firms, since the conditional distributions of growth rates, 
sorted in bins according to their financial position, invariably collapse on the 
same curve.  
To summarize, of the two forms of heterogeneity in the model − i.e., firms' 
financial position and age − the one that really matters in firms’ behavior is the 
former, here measured by the equity ratio a. The analysis above shows that the 
scaling and the self-similarity properties – phenomena which suggest complex 
                                                 
37 A fourth bin, i.e. the partition (0.3319, 1], has been excluded from the plot due to a lack of 
sufficient observations. 
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 behaviors – do not depend on the aggregation of different economic units but it 
is an intrinsic property of an economic system with interacting units buffeted 
with idiosyncratic multiplicative shocks. 
 
                        
 
Figure 10. Distributions of firms' growth rates partitioned according to their equity ratio. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Scaling phenomena and power law distributions are rather unfamiliar concepts 
for scholars interested in business cycle theory, regardless of the fact that these 
objects have been studied in economics since a long time. The reason for this 
neglectfulness should be looked for in the reductionism methodology which has 
so far permeated modern macroeconomics. Our position is that the reductionism 
paradigm is not only theoretically unsatisfying, but it can also be falsified as soon 
as proper new stylized facts are isolated. Concepts and methods inspired from 
physics have revealed particularly useful in detecting new facts and guiding 
theory formation. This paper aims at popularize the scaling approach to business 
fluctuations, by discussing some scaling-based ideas involved in viewing the 
macroeconomy as a complex system composed of a large number of 
heterogeneous interacting agents (HIAs). 
In particular, we present a simple agent-based model of the levered aggregate 
supply class developed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990, 1993), whose core is the 
interaction of heterogeneous financially fragile firms and a banking sector. In 
order to grasp the empirical evidence we adopt a methodological approach based 
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 on agent-based simulations of a system with HIAs. In our framework, the origin 
of business fluctuations can be traced back to the ever changing configuration of 
the network of heterogeneous interacting firms. 
Simulations of the model replicate surprisingly well an impressive set of 
stylized facts, particularly two well known universal laws: i) the distribution of 
firms' size (measured by the capital stock) is skewed and described by a power 
law; ii) the distribution of the rates of change of aggregate and firms' output 
follow a similar Laplace distribution. So far, the literature has dealt with stylized 
facts (i) and (ii) as if they were independent. We have discussed as that power law 
distribution of firms’size lays at the root of the Laplace distribution of growth rates.  
The model can be extended in a number of ways to take into account, among 
other things, the role of aggregate demand, different degrees of market power on 
the goods and credit markets, technological change, policy variables, learning 
processes, etc. Our conjecture, however, is that the empirical validation of more 
complex models will be due to the basic ingredients already present in the 
benchmark framework: the power law distribution of firms’ size and then 
associated Laplace distribution of growth rates which in turn can be traced back 
to the changing financial conditions of firms and banks. 
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 Appendix  
In this appendix we briefly describe the assumptions and procedures we followed to 
simulate the model. A simulation is completely described by the parameter values, the 
initial conditions and the rules to be iterated period after period. First of all, we set the 
parameter values and the initial conditions for state variables needed to start the 
simulation. There parameters of the model are relative to the firm, bank and the entry 
process.  
For the firm we have: 
• the productivity of capital φ,  
• the parameter of the bankruptcy cost equation c,  
• the firm’s equity-loan ratio α,  
• the variable cost parameter g 
For the bank: 
• the mark down on interest rate ω,  
• the weight the bank gives to the capital in allotting the credit supply λ.  
For the entry process: 
• the location parameter d, 
• the sensitivity parameter e, 
• the size parameter . _N
They are set as follows: φ = 0.1 ; c = 1 ; α = 0.08, g = 1.1 ; ω = 0.002, λ =0.3, d = 100, e 
= 0.1.  must be set according to the initial number of firms (see below). The first step of 
the simulation occurs at time t=1. To perform calculations in period 1 for each firm we 
must set initial conditions for firms’ capital, the equity base, profit and bad debt. We 
chose the following  values K
_
N
i0  = 100, Ai0  = 20, Li0  =  80, πi0 = 0, Bi0 = 0. We run 
simulations for several values of initial firms and for different number of iterations. In the 
simulation we report on Section 5 the initial number of firms was set to 10000 and the 
number of iterations to 1000. Given the initial number of firms, we set . The main 
loop is described in the following algorithm.
180
_ =N
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